ESSAY

MASS EXPLOITATION

SAMIR D. PARIKH†
Modern mass tort defendants—including Johnson & Johnson, Purdue Pharma,
USA Gymnastics, and Boy Scouts of America—have developed unprecedented
techniques for resolving mass tort cases. Three weapons in this new arsenal are
particularly noteworthy. Before filing for bankruptcy, corporate defendants undergo
divisive mergers to access bankruptcy on their terms. Once in bankruptcy, these mass
restructuring debtors curate advantageous provisions in the Bankruptcy Code to craft
their own ad hoc resolution mechanism implemented through plans of reorganization.
This maneuver facilitates questionable outcomes, including the third-party releases the
Sackler family recently secured. Finally, a mass restructuring debtor can agree to convert
its tainted business into a public benefit corporation after bankruptcy and devote future
profits—no matter how speculative they may be—to victims in exchange for a reduced
financial contribution to the victims’ settlement trust.
The net effect of these legal innovations is difficult to assess because the intricacies
are not fully understood. Debtors argue that these resolution devices provide accelerated
and amplified distributions. And forum shopping has landed cases before accommodating
jurists willing to tolerate unorthodoxy. The fear, however, is that mass tort victims are
being exploited. The aggregation of these maneuvers may allow culpable parties to
sequester funds outside of the bankruptcy court’s purview and then rely on statutory
loopholes to suppress victim recoveries. Mass restructuring debtors are also pursuing
victim balkanization—an attempt to pit current victims against future victims in order
to facilitate settlements that may actually create disparate treatment across victim classes.
This Essay is the first to identify and assess the new shadowed practices in mass
restructuring cases, providing perspective on interdisciplinary dynamics that have
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eluded academics and policymakers. This is one of the most controversial legal issues
in the country today, but legal academia has largely overlooked it. This Essay seeks
to create a dialogue to explore whether a legislative or judicial response is necessary
and what shape such a response could take.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1956, Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) received an odd request.
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) asked the relatively obscure research laboratory to
analyze large deposits of talc mined in Italy.1 Small amounts of “grit” permeated
batches of talcum powder, rendering some product abrasive.2 J&J wanted BMI
to identify the source, explore methods to filter the offending particles from
future batches, and comprehensively resolve the problem.
BMI produced a pair of reports (BMI Reports), which identiﬁed myriad
particles and contaminates that contributed to abrasiveness.3 In particular,
BMI found in each talc sample a relatively small amount of tremolite. In
exhausting detail, the BMI Reports explored how tremolite’s “cleavage
fragments” were likely causing abrasiveness in J&J’s baby powder.4 The BMI
Reports, however, failed to appreciate the study’s true signiﬁcance: asbestos
1 See W.L. SMITH, BATTELLE MEM’L INST., STUDIES OF THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF
TALC, THEIR MEASUREMENT, AND COMPARISON TO JOHNSON & JOHNSON 1 (1957); see also
W.L. SMITH, BATTELLE MEM’L INST., PROGRESS REPORT ON FURTHER STUDIES ON THE
MEASUREMENT AND CORRELATION OF THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF TALC TO JOHNSON
AND JOHNSON (1958), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/5017501/1957-and-1958-Lab-Reportson-Italian-Talc.pdf [https://perma.cc/X49L-2R5Q].
2 See id.
3 See generally id.
4 See Lisa Girion, Johnson & Johnson Knew for Decades That Asbestos Lurked in its Baby
Powder, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
johnsonandjohnson-cancer [https://perma.cc/M3GU-58KB].
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is the more common name for the ﬁbrous form of tremolite.5 Talc particles
contaminated with asbestos could cause cancer if inhaled or placed in areas
where the particles could enter the body—a placement J&J’s advertising had
encouraged for decades.6
The BMI Reports’ seismic consequences were not lost on J&J executives.7
In subsequent years, the company purchased numerous talc mines searching for
a clean talc source.8 But an April 9, 1969 memo written by the J&J executive
tasked with the company’s talc supply acknowledged that tremolite was a
common particle found in talc deposits and virtually impossible to eliminate.9
J&J never disclosed its fears to the Food & Drug Administration or its
customers.10 Further, its marketing campaign continued to encourage
customers to sprinkle baby powder on their bodies; more speciﬁcally, women
were encouraged to apply the powder to their perineal area.11 Recent lawsuits
alleging a link between the repeated application of talcum powder and ovarian
cancer have forced the release of internal J&J documents.12 New information
has led to a modiﬁed view of talcum powder and a better understanding of
its eﬀects.13 Adverse jury verdicts against J&J culminated in a $4.7 billion
verdict against the company in 2018.14 As of July 29, 2021, there were 38,200

5 Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875):
Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 102-03 (2013) (“Evidence produced during
litigation has shown that at least some asbestos manufacturers were aware of the risks that asbestos
exposure posed to miners and factory workers as early as the 1930s. In the 1960s, a prominent
epidemiological study, directed by Dr. Irving Selikoﬀ and others at Mount Sinai Hospital, described
asbestos inhalation’s harmful eﬀects on insulation workers’ health.”).
6 Tiﬀany Hsu & Roni Caryn Rabin, Johnson & Johnson to End Talc-Based Baby Powder Sales in
North America, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/19/business/johnsonbaby-powder-sales-stopped.html [https://perma.cc/5WEU-TS5L].
7 In the 1960s, Dr. Irving Selikoﬀ substantiated the harmful eﬀects of asbestos inhalation. See
Robreno, supra note 5; DEBORAH R. HENSLER, INST. FOR CIV. JUST., ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (1991).
8 See Girion, supra note 4.
9 See Memorandum from W. H. Ashton, Johnson & Johnson on Alternate Domestic Talc
Sources File No. 101 to Dr. G Hildick-Smith (Apr. 9, 1969).
10 In fact, the company manipulated information in a 2009 report in order to convince the Food
and Drug Administration to forgo placing a warning label on bottles of J&J’s baby powder. See Jef
Feeley & Anna Edney, Unsealed Emails Show How J&J Shaped Report on Talc’s Links to Cancer,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2021, 11:07 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-08/j-j-srole-shaping-cancer-report-revealed-by-unsealed-emails [https://perma.cc/CS4J-X77R].
11 Chris Kirkham & Lisa Girion, Special Report: As Baby Powder Concerns Mounted, J&J Focused
Marketing on Minority, Overweight Women, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-johnson-johnson-marketing-specialrepo/special-report-as-baby-powder-concerns-mounted-jjfocused-marketing-on-minority-overweight-women-idUSKCN1RL1JZ [https://perma.cc/D3JG-HKLL].
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 The award was later reduced to $2.12 billion. See Jef Feeley, Johnson & Johnson Talc Verdict Cut in
Half to $2.1 Billion by State Court, DETROIT NEWS (June 23, 2020, 4:31 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
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talc-related cases pending against the company.15 These lawsuits have been
consolidated in multi-district litigation (MDL) in the U.S. District Court in
New Jersey.
MDL consolidation is frequently the precursor to comprehensive
settlement, but J&J has no intention of going gentle into that good night.
The company recently executed a “divisive merger”—an extremely obscure
maneuver that allowed for the isolation of all liability related to its talcum
powder in one subsidiary. And on October 14, 2021, that subsidiary—LTL
Management LLC—ﬁled for bankruptcy while the other parts of the J&J
empire stayed out of the process.16
Why would one of the most proﬁtable companies in the world even
consider bankruptcy?17 This question is just one of many that arise in the
brave new world of mass restructurings. My recent article unpacked the
answer to this question and explained how federal bankruptcy oﬀers mass tort
defendants the ability to aggregate and resolve state and federal claims on an
accelerated timeline in a forum that is particularly responsive to their
preferences.18 Bankruptcy resolution is the optimal process to resolve many
modern mass tort cases, providing the greatest recovery for the victims’
collective on the shortest timeline. But the process can still undermine
victims’ rights in ways that are obscured.
This Essay explores the new legal innovations and statutory exploitations
that have become part of this process. The story starts before the bankruptcy
ﬁling. Divisive mergers, the state court process designed for small
businesses,19 are being used by corporate behemoths to ﬁle for bankruptcy on
story/business/2020/06/23/johnson-johnson-talc-verdict-cut-half-billion-state-court/112001422
[https://perma.cc/9A3V-L5VG].
15 See Johnson & Johnson, Quarterly Report, 29 (Form 10-Q) (July 29, 2021).
16 See Rick Archer, Johnson & Johnson Puts Talc Spinoff Into Ch. 11, LAW360 (Oct. 14. 2021, 6:29 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1431315/johnson-johnson-puts-talc-spinoff-into-ch-11 [https://perma.cc/
PN9Y-BQYN]; see also Jonathan Randles, Becky Yerak & Andrew Scurria, How Bankruptcy Could
Help Johnson & Johnson Corral Vast Talc Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-bankruptcy-could-help-johnson-johnson-corral-vast-talc-litigation-11626773400
[https://perma.cc/48PV-FPV3]. The bankruptcy case is currently pending before the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. See Vince Sullivan, J&J Talc Liability Unit’s Ch. 11
Transferred to NJ, LAW360 (Nov. 10, 2021, 3:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/bankruptcy/articles/
1439777/j-j-talc-liability-unit-s-ch-11-transferred-to-nj [https://perma.cc/LQ27-3H3U].
17 Johnson & Johnson boasts a roughly $443 billion market value. See Mike Spector, Jessica
Dinapoli & Dan Levine, J&J Exploring Putting Talc Liabilities into Bankruptcy, REUTERS (July 19,
2021, 6:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/exclusive-jj-exploringputting-talc-liabilities-into-bankruptcy-sources-2021-07-18 [https://perma.cc/B6LD-8MQS].
18 See Samir D. Parikh, The New Mass Torts Bargain, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 5); see also Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11’s Checks
and Balances, 100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 28).
19 See Cliﬀ Ernst, Divisive Mergers: How to Divide an Entity into Two or More Entities Under a
Merger Authorized by the Texas Business Organizations Code, 36 CORP. COUNS. REV. 233, 234-35 (2017).
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their terms. Once inside the gates, mass restructuring debtors are exploiting
statutory loopholes to fashion an ex post, ad hoc resolution structure that
seizes all of the Bankruptcy Code’s beneﬁts with few of the costs. There are
many consequences, including nondebtor releases that immunize malfeasance
and insolvent settlement trusts that leave future victims without recovery for
serious injuries. Finally, a revolutionary idea—which I refer to as the Public
Beneﬁt Proposal—theoretically allows a mass tort defendant to reduce its
contribution to a victim settlement trust in exchange for agreeing to convert
its business into a public beneﬁt corporation and devote all proﬁts to victims.
This proposal purports to address the suppressed distributions seen in
modern mass tort cases but could aggravate the risk of insolvent trusts.
I seek to make three primary contributions to the legal literature on
mass torts, civil procedure, and financial restructuring. The result is
primarily descriptive but serves a vital role in determining if corrective
measures are necessary. This Essay is the first to identify the new shadowed
practices, delineating the distinguishing characteristics and unique
complexities they present.
Second, this Essay assesses these new maneuvers through the lens of
victim recoveries. Mass defendants may be acting in ways that advantage
some victims to the detriment of others. This Essay explores how the victim
collective is not a monolith, and balkanization may be corporate defendants’
true objective; pitting current victims against future victims by arguing that
any attempt to fully compensate both groups will lead to signiﬁcant recovery
delays for victims currently suﬀering.
Finally, legal literature has overlooked the intersection of aggregate litigation
and bankruptcy. This oversight has allowed shadowed practices to proliferate
undetected. I hope to engage scholars from various disciplines to explore whether
a legislative or judicial response is necessary and the optimal resulting framework.
I. GAINING ACCESS THROUGH DIVISIVE MERGERS
The Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) has an intentional
quirk. “Merger” is deﬁned to include a division of a business into two new
entities.20 This process is referred to as a “divisive merger”21 and has been an
obscure part of the TBOC since 1989.22 The original design was to protect

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002(55) (West 2021).
I refer to this process as “corporate mitosis,” which more accurately describes the result.
See Ernst, supra note 19, at 234 n.5. Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Delaware have adopted
similar provisions but lack the case history supporting the practice. See Donald F. Parsons, Jr., R.
Jason Russell & Koah M. Douds, The Business Lawyer—Seventy-Five Years Covering the Rise of
Alternative Entities, 75 BUS. LAW. 2467, 2485 n.144 (2020). The limited enactment of this provision
20
21
22
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small businesses—including cattle and farming operations—involved in
potentially dangerous operations.23 A divisive merger allows these businesses
to isolate valuable assets in an entity protected from creditor claims related
to the primary operations.
In the last few years, this quirk of Texas law has garnered a lot of attention.
Mass tort defendants began relying on the divisive merger because it oﬀers
corporate defendants the ability to access bankruptcy on their terms.24 This
interest culminated with J&J’s announcement in October 2021 that it was
planning a divisive merger in order to isolate mass tort liability related to its
iconic talcum powder in a new subsidiary.25 And on October 14, 2021, that
subsidiary, LTL Management LLC, ﬁled for bankruptcy while the other parts
of the J&J empire stayed out of the process.26 Divisive mergers are now center
stage in the growing mass tort wars.
But how does the process work? In most cases, there is a corporate
structure that includes at least one entity that holds valuable business
operations but includes assets tainted by mass tort liability (“InfectedCo”).
The conglomerate faces signiﬁcant liability and may have already suﬀered
adverse judgments or be involved in multi-district litigation. A global
settlement of all mass-tort liability is necessary27 but would require
InfectedCo and perhaps other subsidiaries to ﬁle for bankruptcy “subjecting
the entire . . . enterprise[] and . . . many employees, suppliers, vendors, and
creditors to a chapter 11 proceeding.”28 Bankruptcy represents the best
resolution model,29 but the corporate parent would prefer to avoid subjecting
valuable assets to creditor recovery and convoluted business decisions to
bankruptcy court scrutiny.
In order to effectuate a divisive merger, InfectedCo—invariably a Delaware
entity—incorporates as a limited liability company under Texas state law.
Relying on the TBOC, InfectedCo undergoes corporate mitosis producing two
does not aﬀect its utility. An entity wishing to pursue a divisive merger can simply incorporate in
the necessary state and eﬀect the maneuver.
23 See Ernst, supra note 19, at 235-38.
24 This maneuver has been used in other cases. See, e.g., In re Bestwall LLC, 605 B.R. 43, 47
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2019); In re Aldrich Pump LLC, No. 20-30608, Adv. No. 20-03041, 2021 WL
3729335, at *1 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2021).
25 See, e.g., Randles, supra note 16.
26 See sources cited supra note 16.
27 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining the global settlement imperative facing corporate
defendants).
28 See Declaration of Ray Pittard in Support of First Day Pleadings at 4-5, In re Aldrich Pump LLC,
No. 20-30608, Adv. No. 20-03041, (Bankr. W.D.N.C. June 18, 2020) [hereinafter Pittard Declaration].
29 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 6, 27, 48 (explaining that (i) class aggregation is rarely an option
when the victim class is populated with both current and future victims because a class representative
cannot be appointed when victims have fundamentally divergent interests; and (ii) MDLs have
turned into captive settlement processes that deprive many defendants of autonomy and options).
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new corporate entities. Let’s call them GoodCo and BadCo. Under state law,
InfectedCo is authorized to allocate assets and liabilities among the two new
entities.30 BadCo receives assets of nominal value and becomes solely
responsible for all mass tort claims against InfectedCo. In other words, BadCo
becomes the dumpster for all of InfectedCo’s mass tort liability. GoodCo
receives all other InfectedCo assets and liabilities. InfectedCo is dissolved.
This process eﬀectively isolates mass tort liability in BadCo, unless the
allocation constitutes a fraudulent transfer.31 To address this daunting risk,
GoodCo and BadCo sign various agreements designed to prop up what is
ostensibly a shell company. The “Support Agreement” establishes reciprocal
indemniﬁcation obligations corresponding to the allocation of liabilities in
the divisive merger.32 In other words, this agreement obligates both GoodCo
and BadCo to indemnify each other for all losses incurred in connection with
their respective assets and liabilities.33 The “Funding Agreement” serves a
loftier goal. This agreement requires GoodCo to provide funding for all costs
and expenses incurred by BadCo to the extent BadCo lacks suﬃcient funds
to satisfy such obligations.34 Mass tort defendants argue that this
agreement—which is the linchpin to defending against a fraudulent transfer
claim—ensures that BadCo has the same ability to pay oﬀ its mass tort claims
as InfectedCo did before the divisive merger.
After these machinations, GoodCo can remain a Texas company but will
most likely reincorporate in Delaware. BadCo domiciles itself in a
jurisdiction that will facilitate forum shopping to a friendly bankruptcy
venue. BadCo ﬁling for bankruptcy is the ﬁnal step.
A divisive merger allows the parent to isolate mass tort liabilities in one
subsidiary and then have that subsidiary—and that subsidiary alone—ﬁle for
bankruptcy. Mass tort defendants can access bankruptcy on their terms and
potentially keep valuable assets out of victims’ reach. Once inside the gates,
the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory loopholes raise exploitation risks.
II. AD HOC RESOLUTION IN BANKRUPTCY
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide structured
relief to debtors facing claims based on asbestos exposure; only debtors facing
30 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 10.003 (West 2021). The allocation must be made under a
plan of division, which is not ﬁled with the state.
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (establishing the criteria for avoidance of a fraudulent transfer).
32 See Pittard Declaration, supra note 28, at 9 (detailing the responsibilities contemplated in the funding
agreements, including indemnification); see also Adversary Complaint at 8-9, Off. Comm. of Asbestos
Claimants v. Bestwall LLC (In re Bestwall), No. 17-31795, Adv. No. 20-03049 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. July 29, 2020)
(same).
33 Pittard Declaration, supra note 28, at 8-10; Adversary Complaint, supra note 32, at 8-9.
34 Pittard Declaration, supra note 28, at 8-10; Adversary Complaint, supra note 32, at 8-9.
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those types of claims fall within the section’s purview.35 The section also imposes
various restrictions to protect asbestos victims. But modern mass torts rarely
involve asbestos claims.36 The new mass restructuring debtors are not subject to
§ 524(g) or any of the various victim protections found therein. This freedom
has allowed mass restructuring debtors to impose a new bargain on victims.
A. Section 524(g)
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code is a bespoke statutory provision
enacted to address mass restructurings involving asbestos exposure claims.37
Generally, an asbestos debtor has the option to fund a settlement trust to
resolve all victim claims. In exchange, the debtor receives immunity through
a channeling injunction that redirects all claims to the settlement trust.38 The
injunction can also be extended to nondebtor parties, including a parent
corporation, aﬃliated entities, acquirers of assets, and insurance companies.39
This structure is implemented through the debtor’s plan of reorganization.
The primary features include: (1) the creation of a victims’ trust funded by the
debtor, affiliated entities, and insurers for payment to pay all present and
future asbestos claims; (2) a channeling injunction that prevents attempts to
pursue any claims based on asbestos exposure against parties protected by the
plan; and (3) a future claim representative appointed to negotiate on behalf of
unknown, future victims and presumably satisfy Due Process strictures.40
B. Exploiting Loopholes in the Bankruptcy Code
Section 524(g) does not apply to most modern mass restructuring cases.
One may conclude that these debtors lament their exclusion, but it’s actually
an opportunity. Excluded debtors are fashioning their own ad hoc resolution
structures by extracting beneﬁcial provisions and concepts out of § 524(g),
dropping them into a plan of reorganization,41 and then convincing a

35 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B) (explaining that the provision is limited to cases involving injury
caused by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products).
36 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 5.
37 See id. at 32-34 (explaining the history of § 524(g)).
38 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A). The injunction’s scope is extremely broad, capturing “any right
to or demand for payment that arises from the debtor’s underlying asbestos liabilities, regardless of
when that right or demand arises, whether it was raised during the bankruptcy proceeding or is
contingent on a future event.” In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 2013).
39 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(a)(ii).
40 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 34 (detailing these and three other primary features found in
reorganization plans).
41 I refer to these as “exempt plans” because they are not subject to § 524(g)’s restrictions.
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bankruptcy judge to bless the Frankenstein creation pursuant to her § 10542
equitable powers.43 These exempt plans enjoy § 524(g)’s beneﬁts without the
costs. For example, § 524(g) has a 75%-voting threshold that must be cleared
before victims’ classes can be deemed to have “accepted” the proposed plan—
a requirement under the Code.44 But exempt plans do not have to meet this
voting threshold. A simple majority vote is suﬃcient.45
Section 524(g)’s channeling injunction and nondebtor releases are the
most desirable features of the bankruptcy process. However, the channeling
injunction envisioned by § 524(g) is intended to protect the debtor
exclusively.46 Nondebtor parties—including aﬃliated entities and insurance
companies—would love to secure the injunction’s protection. These parties
may only be included in the injunction’s broad protection if various onerous
criteria under § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) are satisﬁed.47 Modern mass tort cases are
not subject to this restriction. Exempt plans authorize channeling injunctions
and third-party releases that protect a wide swath of nondebtor parties,
including parent and aﬃliate corporate entities, insurers, professional
advisors, board members, and various administrative agents.48 Some releases
are actually designed to protect nondebtor third parties from liability for
conduct unrelated to the debtor or its business.49 The debtor is merely

42 Section 105 of the Code allows the bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provision of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
This provision has been construed to aﬀord bankruptcy courts sweeping powers, and bankruptcy
courts have not been shy about exploring the broadest reaches of the section’s power conferment.
See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 340 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing § 105(a) as vesting
bankruptcy courts with broad equitable power, subject to the parameters of the bankruptcy code).
43 See, e.g., Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation at 70, In re Insys
Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Insys Plan of
Reorganization] (relying on § 105 powers for injunctions and stays in a bankruptcy case); see also
Fifth Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 102, In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-10343
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 18, 2020) [hereinafter BSA Plan of Reorganization] (relying on § 105 equitable
injunction power). In fact, corporate debtors who were entitled to use § 524(g) have tried to ignore
the subsection and convince bankruptcy courts to use § 105 to allow for an alternative structure. See
In re Energy Future Holdings, Corp., 949 F.3d 806, 825 (3d Cir. 2020) (chastising a party for
“attempting to circumvent § 524(g)”).
44 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
45 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 36.
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not aﬀect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”).
47 See, e.g., Pﬁzer Inc. v. Law Oﬃces of Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Co, Inc.), 676 F.3d 45,
59-60, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an injunction could not be extended to protect a debtor’s
parent entity); see also Parikh, supra note 18, at 36-37.
48 See, e.g., Insys Plan of Reorganization, supra note 43, at 73; BSA Plan of Reorganization supra
note 43 at 109-10, 112-13.
49 See, e.g., Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 113-14, In re Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021) [hereinafter Purdue’s Fifth Amended
Plan] (releasing liability for tort, contract, fraud, negligence, and other forms of liability).

62

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 170: 53

required to show that the protected party was necessary for formulating and
implementing the victims’ trust at issue—an extremely low bar to clear.50
Further, § 524(g) attempts to satisfy due process concerns in many mass
tort cases by requiring the appointment of a future claimants’ representative,
or FCR, to advocate for unknown, future victims.51 The FCR’s approval is
necessary before future victims’ claims can be subject to a channeling
injunction or other disposition.52 This procedure has already been adopted in
modern mass tort cases not subject to § 524(g).53 Unfortunately, the
procedure is inherently ﬂawed.
The Code fails to prescribe selection procedures for the FCR, who has
the exclusive power to bind unknown, future victims, but operates without
any client oversight. This dynamic is arguably unavoidable when dealing with
future victims, but the agency breakdown is more severe than it seems. Courts
have delegated this responsibility to the mass restructuring debtor—the very
party against whom the FCR will be negotiating.54 Invariably, the debtor is
the only stakeholder that proposes FCR candidates and, in almost all cases,
nominates only one.55 The only standard of review is that the nominee be
disinterested—which represents an extremely low bar focused on whether the
individual has any blatant conﬂicts of interest.56 Once a selection is made,
courts do not review the FCR’s performance. Future victims lack opt out
rights. Victims whose harm manifests on a longer timeline and who face
extremely inequitable settlement terms have no recourse against the FCR,
50 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4); see also Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization at 32-33, In re TK Holdings Inc., No. 17-11375 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 5, 2018)
[hereinafter TK Holdings Third Amended Plan] (releasing liability for a broad category of liability
of debtors and third parties).
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B). Naturally, many mass tort cases do not involve unknown, future
claimants and avoid the complexities created by the FCR.
52 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1)(c).
53 See, e.g., TK Holdings Third Amended Plan, supra note 50, at 6 (noting the appointment of
a future claimants’ representative in a case not involving asbestos liability).
54 See, e.g., Vara v. Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp. (In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp.), No. 18-15563, Adv.
No. 18-15563, 2019 WL 4745879, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019) (“[A] debtor—or any other party in
interest—may nominate the future claimants’ representative and [] a bankruptcy court may approve
a debtor’s nominee.”); In re Fairbanks Co., 601 B.R. 831, 842-44 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019) (allowing a
debtor’s nomination of the future claimants’ representative to stand after conducting an independent
analysis of his qualiﬁcations); In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., No 19-10289, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1452, at
*10-15 (Bankr. D. Del. May 8, 2019) (same).
55 See In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp., 2019 WL 4745879, at *1 (nominating one); In re Fairbanks
Co., 601 B.R. at 833 (same); In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1452, at *2 (same).
56 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (deﬁning a “disinterested person” as someone who is “not a creditor,
an equity security holder, or an insider,” is not or was not in the two years prior to ﬁling an oﬃcer,
director, or employee of the debtor, and “does not have an interest materially adverse” to any creditor
of the debtor); In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp., 2019 WL 4745879, at *7-10 (holding that the
“disinterested” standard under § 101(14) applies to the future claimants’ representative, rather than
the “appearance of impropriety” standard).
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who enjoys broad immunity through the plan of reorganization for all actions
aside from fraud, gross negligence, and willful misconduct.57
The idea that the FCR would fail to be a zealous advocate may seem
confusing at ﬁrst but emerges with shocking clarity when one considers the
capture risk involved in mass tort cases. A small pool of professionals manages
the universe of mass tort bankruptcy cases, and the process is characterized
by repeat players. FCRs receive signiﬁcant fees and, once appointed,
immediately hire as legal counsel the law ﬁrm at which they are a partner,
thereby amplifying the beneﬁt. The promise of multiple engagements can
incentivize an FCR to discount her invisible clients’ interests.
Exempt plans produce distorted results. The Purdue Pharma bankruptcy
case is just one example of this. After extensive rounds of negotiation with
various governmental agencies and creditor committees, the Sackler family
agreed to contribute approximately $4.3 billion to the victims’ settlement
trust.58 In exchange, the debtor’s plan provided comprehensive releases for
(i) Raymond and Mortimer Sackler, (ii) all of their living and unborn
descendants, (iii) all current and future spouses, and (iv) various associated
parties that could include thousands of unknown individuals.59 The initial
releases insulated these protected parties from conduct unrelated to Purdue
Pharma or its business and protected any type of civil misconduct—including
fraud, gross negligence, willful misconduct, and deliberate ignorance.60 It
would have been extremely diﬃcult to justify these releases if the company
had been subject to § 524(g).61 But without § 524(g)’s restrictions, the

57 See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos
Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841, 899 (“[B]ankruptcy plans routinely shield legal
representatives from liability to future claimants for all but the most egregious misconduct.”).
58 See Brian Mann, The Sacklers, Who Made Billions from OxyContin, Win Immunity from Opioid
Lawsuits, NPR (Sept. 1. 2021, 7:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/01/1031053251/sackler-familyimmunity-purdue-pharma-oxcyontin-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/QWR6-F8AM].
59 Memorandum of Law in Support of U.S. Trustee’s Expedited Motion for a Stay of
Conﬁrmation Order at 6, In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2021)
[hereinafter UST’s Stay Motion].
60 Purdue’s Fifth Amended Plan, supra note 49, at 113-14 (releasing liability for all “claims,
counterclaims, disputes, obligations . . . .”).
61 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 36-37 (discussing § 524(g)’s requirement that 75% of voting
victim class members approve the plan and that the victim trust must be funded in part by the
debtor’s securities and also by the reorganized debtor). A nondebtor party can enjoy the protections
of § 524(g)’s channeling injunction only if various onerous criteria are satisﬁed under §
524(g)(4)(A)(ii)—a task that has proven to be quite diﬃcult. See generally In re Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2004) (barring the use of the general powers of § 105
to achieve a result not contemplated by § 524).

64

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 170: 53

bankruptcy court approved Purdue’s plan of reorganization62 with the
controversial Sackler family releases intact.63
Gaining access to bankruptcy facilitates expedited resolution. This
prospect is transformative to current victims facing staggering health care
costs, providing meaningful recoveries instead of endless courtroom delays.
But there is a potential cataclysm imbedded in this process. In the rush to
resolve these crises, jurists may accept settlements that place the risk of nonrecovery on future victims. This is what I describe as victim balkanization.
This is the process by which debtors pit current victims against future victims
with a simple threat: any attempt to secure comparable recoveries across the
victim class will lead to signiﬁcant delays in case resolution and ultimately
deprive current victims of any recovery in the short term.64 This subtle threat
permeates settlement discussions and raises the specter that the court will
approve a resolution model that allows current victims to be ﬁrst to the trough
while leaving little for future victims whose claims are no less meritorious.
The Public Beneﬁt Proposal, explored below, adds further complexity to the
quagmire by allowing mass tort defendants to oﬀer a potentially illusory
promise to victims in exchange for a reduced ﬁnancial contribution.

62 See Twelfth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at 123, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2021) [hereinafter Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan] (releasing
the parties from opioid liability); UST’s Stay Motion, supra note 59, at 6 (stating that the
reorganization plan included a release for the Sackler family); Rick Archer, Purdue Pharma Ch. 11
Plan Gets OK With Sackler Releases, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1417959/purdue-pharma-ch-11-plan-gets-ok-with-sackler-releases [https://perma.cc/8CWHZECW] (“The family members will be released from any opioid claims . . . .”); see also Vince
Sullivan, Rhode Island Balks at Mallinckrodt Ch. 11’s CEO Release, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2021, 6:13 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1430837/rhode-island-balks-at-mallinckrodt-ch-11-s-ceo-release
[https://perma.cc/LQC6-VHH8] (noting that, among others, Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy released
non-debtor parties). Though arguably unprecedented, the Purdue’s plan of reorganization had the
support of virtually all signiﬁcant stakeholders in the case. Nevertheless, Senator Warren and some
of her Senate colleagues have proposed the Nondebtor Release Prohibition Act of 2021, which would
virtually eliminate the use of non-consensual, non-debtor releases as to private claims. See S. 2497,
117th Cong. (2021); H.R. 4777, 117th Cong. (2021); Hailey Konnath, Dems Unveil Bill Targeting
Bankruptcy Releases Like Sacklers’, LAW360 (July 28, 2021, 9:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1407713 [https://perma.cc/5QGJ-H9N5] (“The Nondebtor Release Prohibition Act of 2021
looks to eliminate the use of such non-consensual, third-party releases . . . .”).
63 The order conﬁrming the plan of reorganization was appealed and recently vacated. See Rick
Archer, Purdue Pharma’s Ch. 11 Plan Is Unraveled on Appeal, LAW360 (Dec. 16, 2021, 7:21 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1449669/purdue-pharma-s-ch-11-plan-is-unraveled-on-appeal
[https://perma.cc/2TYW-9LAY]. Purdue has appealed the ruling. See Leslie Pappas, Purdue Asks to Keep
Lawsuits Frozen Pending Ch. 11 Appeal, LAW360 (Dec. 21, 2021, 7:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1450909/purdue-asks-to-keep-lawsuits-frozen-pending-ch-11-appeal [https://perma.cc/A3NR-TBVY].
64 I acknowledge that victim balkanization was not present in the Purdue case but wish to note
that this dynamic has emerged in other mass tort cases and may be an eﬀective strategy in Johnson
& Johnson’s attempt to resolve its talcum powder liability.
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III. THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC BENEFIT PROPOSAL
Bankruptcy architecture provides two primary resolution models for
corporate debtors with viable businesses. A debtor can restructure its business
by using the Bankruptcy Code’s various forms of relief and emerge as a new
entity. A debtor may also sell some or substantially all of its assets through a
§ 363 asset sale65 and use proceeds to satisfy creditor claims. But Purdue
Pharma proposed something unprecedented in its bankruptcy case. Instead
of selling its proﬁtable business operations, the company sought to emerge
from bankruptcy as a public beneﬁt corporation.66
Purdue owns a business that could generate billions in future proﬁts.
Unfortunately, the business is tainted by the criminality and gross
malfeasance committed by its executives. This taint could presumably destroy
enterprise value and suppress bidder interest in any auction. In other words,
Purdue could try to sell its scandalous—but otherwise proﬁtable—business
through an asset sale in bankruptcy, but the proceeds will most likely be
materially less than what it would have otherwise received without its scarlet
letter.67 As an alternative, Purdue’s plan of reorganization oﬀered to continue
the company’s business operations after the bankruptcy case and devote
proﬁts to compensate victims of the opioid crisis.68 This approach would also
allow victims to enjoy a quasi-equity position. To the extent that the public

65 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sell all of its assets through courtsupervised auction process. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). In many circumstances, these sales represent the
optimal means of securing funds to compensate creditors. See generally Douglas G. Baird, The New
Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69 (2004).
66 The genesis of the idea is unclear. In October 2020, the DOJ announced an agreement with
Purdue Pharma as part of an attempt to resolve various federal claims against the company (the
“PBP Agreement”). The PBP Agreement requires Purdue to emerge from bankruptcy as a public
beneﬁt corporation functioning entirely in the public interest. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just.,
Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations with Opioid
Manufacturer Purdue Pharma and Civil Settlement with Members of the Sackler Family (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-global-resolution-criminal-and-civilinvestigations-opioid [https://perma.cc/3HVR-889Y]. A number of Senators have argued that
Sackler family members were the “driving force” behind the provision. See Letter from Tammy
Baldwin, U.S. Sen. et al. to the Hon. William Barr, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (Nov. 10, 2020)
[hereinafter Baldwin Letter] https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.11.10%20Senators%
20to%20Barr%20re%20Purdue%20FINAL%20(001).pdf [https://perma.cc/L685-QAMF] (“Purdue and
the Sackler family are the driving force behind the inclusion of the PBC in the agreement . . . .”). But this
claim lacks substantiation. See also infra Part IV.C (explaining the public benefit corporation proposal).
67 See Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at
app. B, 3-6, Exhibit 1, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2021)
(estimating discounted sale prices for Purdue’s assets).
68 Jeremy Hill, Sophie Alexander, Jef Feeley & Riley Griffin, Sacklers to Exit From Complex Purdue
Bankruptcy With Billions, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 2, 2021, 8:56 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
health-law-and-business/sacklers-to-exit-from-complex-purdue-bankruptcy-with-billions
[https://perma.cc/WNZ9-NGFS].
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beneﬁt corporation is wildly successful, victims will be able to participate in
that windfall. Finally, any excess, residual proﬁts from the reorganized debtor
could be deployed to beneﬁt the public at large. I refer to this concept as the
Public Beneﬁt Proposal.69
Purdue’s design for a reorganized public beneﬁt corporation has relatively
simple mechanics. The primary covenants provide for the creation of a new
limited liability company called Knoa Pharma.70 Purdue’s plan provides that
Knoa must (i) fundamentally operate for the public beneﬁt, (ii) consider longterm public-health interests relating to the opioid crisis in its decisionmaking
processes, and (iii) employ transparent and sustainable management
practices.71 More speciﬁcally, Knoa must develop and distribute medicines to
treat opioid addiction and reverse opioid overdoses.72 The company will be
run by a board of managers73 selected by oﬃcials from the various states that
brought suit against Purdue (the “Governmental Consent Parties”) in
consultation with the creditors’ committee and the debtor.74 The managers
must be disinterested, independent, and experienced in one or more areas
related to health care, law enforcement, or business administration.75 A
monitor is also part of the process and tasked with reviewing Knoa’s
compliance with its corporate covenants and bankruptcy court orders. Similar
to the company’s board, the monitor is selected by the Governmental Consent
Parties in consultation with the creditors’ committee and the debtor.76
Knoa will operate until 2024, at which time all assets will be sold and
proceeds distributed pursuant to the plan waterfall.77 Knoa must ﬁrst satisfy
all operating expenses; excess funds then ﬂow to victim trusts and various
69 For a detailed explanation of the Public Benefit Proposal, see Samir D. Parikh, Scarlet-Lettered
Bankruptcy: A Public Benefit Proposal for Mass Tort Villains, 117 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
70 Matt Levine, Opinion, The Purdue Bankruptcy Didn’t Work, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2021, 1:11
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-12-23/the-purdue-bankruptcy-didn-t-work
[https://perma.cc/G5FK-QF3S].
71 Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan, supra note 62, at 22-23 (including this in the deﬁnition of
“NewCo Governance Covenants”).
72 See In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 21-07532, 2021 WL 5979108, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021)
(“[Knoa] will manufacture products, including Betadine, Denokot, Colace, magnesium products,
opioids and opioid-abatement medications, and oncology therapies.”); see also Levine, supra note 70.
73 There will be either ﬁve or seven managers. The ultimate design will be delineated in the
order conﬁrming the plan of reorganization. See In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 2021 WL 5979108, at *28.
74 See Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan, supra note 62, at 71 (Section 5.4(d)) (describing the
appointment of the NewCo managers).
75 Id. The Department of Justice is aﬀorded the right to oversee the selection process but does
not appear to have the ability to veto selections. Id.
76 Id. at 71-72 (Section 5.4(i)).
77 Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, supra
note 67, at app. F (describing the Knoa “Disposition Event” wherein the company will be dissolved
by December 31, 2024); Purdue’s Twelfth Amended Plan, supra note 62, at 63-64 (Section 5.2(f))
(describing the MDT, NewCo, and TopCo Priority Waterfalls).
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state and local governments to support opioid abatement programs.
Nevertheless, Purdue estimates that approximately $5.5 billion will be
distributed to victims.78
The Public Benefit Proposal is intriguing because it offers a model for
companies contemplating bankruptcy that hold extremely valuable assets tainted
by corporate criminality. An attempt to sell these assets during a time of public
fervor would be questionable. There is a high risk that value would be materially
suppressed.79 A full chapter 11 reorganization may be similarly futile. A mere
rebranding will not remove the residual stain or address harsh public scrutiny.
The Public Benefit Proposal is a type of deferred asset sale with a publicly
conscious entity offering a philanthropy shield behind which assets can be
cleansed.80 This proposal could be instrumental in preserving value for
companies that have engaged in evil—value that should ultimately be directed to
victims.
Despite these platitudes, the Public Beneﬁt Proposal could be used for a
far less honorable purpose. The proposal could be implemented in a way that
helps a mass restructuring debtor and perhaps its parent company reduce the
mandatory up-front contribution to a victims’ settlement trust, diminishing
the ﬁnancial burden while still securing nondebtor releases.81 More
speciﬁcally, a mass restructuring debtor could propose a plan that includes a
large ﬁnancial contribution to a victims’ settlement trust but with a signiﬁcant
portion of this contribution derived from the future revenue of a reorganized
public beneﬁt corporation. Victims would bear the risk of overstated future
revenue projections and subsequent insolvency.82
IV. ASSESSING THE NEW MANEUVERS
One could argue that the mere fact that mass tort defendants are pursuing
these maneuvers establishes that victims will be disadvantaged. But such

78 See Debtors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Conﬁrmation of Debtors’ Sixth Amended
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 150, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649, (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Purdue Memorandum of Law].
79 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (2007) (ﬁnding that distressed large public companies sell for only a fraction of book value).
80 See Parikh, supra note 69 (explaining the intricacies of the Public Beneﬁt Proposal).
81 To be clear, this was apparently not the case in Purdue. The Sackler family was aﬀorded
various concessions, including third-party releases, but these concessions were not the result of
promises regarding Knoa’s future performance. Rather, these concessions—which were ultimately
approved by virtually all signiﬁcant stakeholders in the case—were made to secure a prompt
settlement and avoid decades of litigation with the Sackler family. See Hill, supra note 68.
82 See Baldwin Letter, supra note 66, at 2 (“The plan allows Purdue to inﬂate the value of the
settlement by relying on its own rosy analysis of the company’s value and promising to pay the terms
of a settlement out of the future proﬁts of the company.”).
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conclusions represent mere speculation. In my recent article, 83 I explained
the global settlement imperative and how bankruptcy is oftentimes the
optimal means of satisfying the imperative because it aggregates claims and
oﬀers accelerated resolution and ﬁnality. Ultimately, there are myriad reasons
why mass tort defendants are pulling the bankruptcy lever. But landmines
persist. The material risk is that the new maneuvers could undermine victim
recoveries. Indeed, corporate mitosis oﬀers defendants the ability to
sequester valuable corporate assets outside of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy
Code allows mass restructuring debtors to create an underfunded settlement
trust that minimizes a debtor’s ﬁnancial burden. And the Public Beneﬁt
Proposal could represent an illusory promise that further heightens the risk
of an insolvent settlement trust.
This Section explores these fears and offers some insight for the path forward.
A. Divisive Mergers and Funding Agreement Infirmities
Divisive mergers remove some barriers to a bankruptcy filing.84 I believe
that victims on the whole benefit by mass tort defendants accessing bankruptcy;
without this option, victims would have to seek recovery on a case-by-case basis
through the court system—a process that could take years—and hope for
enough victories to force the mass tort defendant to the settlement table. But
mass tort defendants are not restricted in accessing bankruptcy. That option is
always available and cannot be infringed by creditors or contracts.85 Divisive
mergers allow mass tort defendants to access bankruptcy on their terms and
potentially eliminate a source of creditor recovery.
Companies employing this maneuver have pointed out that the process is
authorized under Texas state law and may be attacked only if assets are
fraudulently transferred.86 To address this risk, mass tort defendants seek
cover behind the ubiquitous funding agreement, which presumably aﬀords
See Parikh, supra note 18, at 4, 13 (describing the global settlement imperative).
See supra Part I (explaining how separating mass tort liability from valuable corporate assets
creates a more palatable path into bankruptcy for mass tort defendants).
85 See, e.g., The Bank of China v. Huang (In re Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that any contract term seeking to prohibit a bankruptcy filing is void as contrary to federal public policy).
86 See Cara Salvatore, J&J May Court Trouble with “Texas Two-Step” Talc Gambit, LAW360 (Sept.
20, 2021, 10:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1423468 [https://perma.cc/QEF7-BXT8]
(“Moving money before bankruptcy in order to avoid paying back debts is the quintessential
fraudulent transfer.”); see also Bill Wichert, NJ Court Won’t Stop J&J’s “Texas Two-Step” in Talc Suits,
LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2021, 5:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1423620/nj-court-won-t-stopj-j-s-texas-two-step-in-talc-suits [https://perma.cc/PX8Z-2VP2] (detailing the Texas “Two-Step”
bankruptcy maneuver that requires a clear ﬁnding of a fraudulent transfer to invalidate); accord Cara
Salvatore, J&J Won’t Be Barred From ‘Texas Two-Step’ in Delaware Court, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2021,
9:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1416758/j-j-won-t-be-barred-from-texas-two-step-in-delawarecourt [https://perma.cc/K5TB-KMXJ].
83
84
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BadCo—the company that ﬁles for bankruptcy—the same repayment
capabilities enjoyed by InfectedCo—the pre-bankruptcy iteration. But this
statement is misleading. InfectedCo’s valuable assets are excluded from the
bankruptcy process. To the extent the bankruptcy process suppresses victim
distributions, the corporate parent will beneﬁt.
And funding agreements present their own inﬁrmities. In mass tort
bankruptcies from previous generations, responsible parties made large
contributions to victims’ settlement trusts in exchange for various
protections.87 These parties provided funds in lump sums. This arrangement
avoided the fear of a responsible party’s subsequent insolvency derailing the
trust. But funding agreements today are designed to push risk onto victims.88
Funding agreements seen so far make GoodCo—the healthy sister company
of BadCo—responsible for BadCo’s obligations. But the ﬁnancial burden does
not appear as a lump-sum obligation; instead, the agreement envisions what
I refer to as drip ﬁnancing. BadCo agrees to a monthly funding schedule
based on invoices presented by the victims’ trust.89 These invoices are routed
to GoodCo, which is obligated to fund expenses that are warranted under the
governing documents and court orders.
Keep in mind that settlement trusts must invariably endure for decades.
What if GoodCo failed just a few years after conﬁrmation? The funding
agreement is unsecured and unguaranteed. And there is no provision in the
funding agreement that delineates a contingency plan if GoodCo cannot
make the necessary payments. Further, there is no covenant restricting
GoodCo from transferring assets. The import of this design emerges with
amazing clarity: victims bear all insolvency risk. This outcome is at odds with
the mass tort architecture that has dictated outcomes for the last 50 years.
Restricting divisive mergers through injunctive relief does not appear to
be realistic.90 However, divisive mergers that involve funding agreements that
push insolvency risk onto victims should be viewed as fraudulent transfers
because the ﬁnancial backstop—GoodCo’s assets—could very well prove to
be a mirage. Bankruptcy courts should reject drip ﬁnancing arrangements
that lack insurance backstops, multiple corporate guarantees, or other
87 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621-22, 27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (describing
funding agreements in which a victims’ trust was initially funded with a substantial amount of cash,
to be supplemented yearly, and a reorganized company was protected from certain claims, including
those for punitive damages, to ensure it remained viable to continue funding the trust).
88 See Pittard Declaration, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing the Funding Agreements and related
ﬁnancial obligations); see also Adversary Complaint, supra note 32, at 16-17 (describing funding
agreements in In re Bestwall, In re Aldrich Pump, and In re Murray Boiler).
89 See Pittard Declaration, supra note 28, at 24-56; see also Adversary Complaint, supra note 32, at 1112.
90 See sources cited supra note 86 (noting courts have refused to dismiss bankruptcy cases that
follow divisive mergers).
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ﬁnancial safety nets. Ideally, settlement trusts would be funded by upfront
contributions that help insulate the trust from subsequent cascading
insolvencies. Ultimately, judicial intervention can easily address this potential
inequity once jurists are made aware of these subtle tactics.91
B. Simple Changes to Close Statutory Loopholes
I acknowledge that mass restructuring debtors have exploited loopholes
in the Bankruptcy Code to accelerate the plan conﬁrmation process. Simple
statutory amendments, however, could enhance process integrity and avoid
disparate treatment across victim classes. Primarily, § 524(g) must be
amended to capture all mass tort cases, including those that do not involve
asbestos claims; this one change will limit the ability of nondebtor parties to
secure releases or otherwise be protected by the channeling injunction. To
minimize FCR capture risk, new § 524(g) should (i) require the appointment
of three FCRs, (ii) allow only the United States Trustee—as opposed to the
mass restructuring debtor—to propose viable candidates, and (iii) require
that all candidates be disinterested, qualified, and competent to effectively
represent future victims’ interests.92 Conceptually, these changes are relatively
simple. As explored in my recent article, the final design will require a more
comprehensive assessment of § 524(g)—a provision drafted almost three
decades ago—to ensure alignment with modern policy objectives.93

91 In response to a prior draft, Professor Lynn LoPucki gently chided me for my apparent
naivete. I argue that bankruptcy judges can easily limit exploitive debtor behavior. This much is
true. However, many scholars will counter that rampant forum shopping in bankruptcy undermines
the viability of this proposal. Corporate debtors can easily locate cases in any jurisdiction they
choose. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES
IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 19-24 (2005) (describing how “an era of rampant,
routine forum shopping” leads to a decrease in bankruptcy cases for some jurisdictions); see also
Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 CONN. L. REV. 159, 163, 173-81 (2013)
(“[T]he forum shopping phenomenon continues to plague the bankruptcy system . . . .”). And at
least some judges are interested in securing these reputation-making cases. Therefore, there will
always be a receptive court for these debtors, regardless of how easily corrective measures can be
implemented. I acknowledge that forum shopping is bankruptcy’s poisonous tree, bearing many
fruits. However, statutory amendments cannot resolve many granular bankruptcy problems, and
amendments to the Code happen infrequently. Judicial action invariably represents the most viable
means for policing exploitive behaviors. Ultimately, forum shopping’s specter must be
acknowledged, but Congress is the only body capable of and willing to resolve that issue.
92 See Parikh, supra note 18, at 46 (advocating for a more demanding standard of review but
recognizing that the ultimate formulation must be left up to the bankruptcy court).
93 See id.
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C. The Public Benefit Proposal and Illusory Promises
The Public Beneﬁt Proposal has allure. In the right context, the proposal
can solve fundamental threats to asset value. There is a certain level of
equitable balance in a company that has done evil being reorganized to ﬁght
that evil. The victims’ collective, as the new owner of the reorganized entity,
has the possibility of sharing in a shareholder windfall if the company
experiences unexpected success after emerging from bankruptcy.
In the Purdue case, one fear with the public beneﬁt model was that a lack
of strong governance and oversight would prevent Knoa from fulﬁlling its
lofty societal goals. And that may well be the case. But Knoa’s mission is clear
and supported by strong covenants enforced by the bankruptcy court. As
noted above, the board of managers will be selected by state oﬃcials
presumably representing victims’ interests. Further, Knoa has a courtsupervised monitor—also appointed by these state oﬃcials—tasked with
reviewing Knoa’s operations and reporting back to the bankruptcy court. And
to the extent Knoa is incorporated in Delaware, there are various statutory
provisions that limit actions contrary to a public beneﬁt corporation’s stated
public mission.94 These factors improve the likelihood that Knoa’s lofty
societal goals will be fulﬁlled.
The problem with the Public Beneﬁt Proposal is that Knoa may fulﬁll its
societal goals but fail to fulﬁll its ﬁnancial ones. Purdue Pharma had $2.3
billion in net sales from OxyContin alone in 2010.95 By 2018, net OxyContin
sales were down to $810 million, before falling to $517 million in 2020.96
Purdue estimates that Knoa will provide $5.5 billion to victims, but much of
that value comes indirectly from supposed price discounts on anti-overdose
drugs and opioid dependence treatments.97 Further, Knoa will be sold or
liquidated by 2024. Purdue’s key patents for OxyContin are set to expire in
2025 and 2027, at which point generics will be an existential threat.98 With
that looming, it is unclear if Knoa will have any value by 2024. Once sold, a
buyer of Knoa would not be bound by the Public Beneﬁt Proposal and could
abandon those principles entirely.
94 See DEL. CODE. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2021) (requiring a public beneﬁt corporation to issue
biennial public beneﬁt reports); id. § 367 (authorizing shareholder suits to enforce a stated speciﬁc
public beneﬁt); Leo E Strine, Jr., Making It Easier For Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 235, 243-45 (2014) (outlining provisions in the Delaware statute that create a duty for
a public beneﬁt corporation to focus on the public good).
95 Hill, supra note 68.
96 Id.
97 See Purdue Memorandum of Law, supra note 78, at 150 (“The majority of that $5.5 billion
will be provided to creditor trusts . . . that will be used to fund opioid crisis abatement programs
across the United States.”).
98 See Hill, supra note 68.
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Stepping outside of the Purdue case, one can see the Public Benefit
Proposal’s primary flaw. A mass restructuring debtor could overestimate the
reorganized public benefit corporation’s value and—based on that error—seek a
substantial credit in its mandatory contribution to the victims’ settlement trust.
In such a case, the credit to the debtor would well exceed the ultimate benefit to
victims. Courts should be open to a public benefit model for value preservation,
but corporate beneficiaries of the proposal should receive credits on a staggered
timeline informed by the public benefit corporation’s future performance. To
the extent that the Public Benefit Proposal finds its way into future mass
restructuring cases, bankruptcy courts must be able to address this risk.99
Ultimately, the public beneﬁt model could serve an essential value
preservation role in upcoming cases. In our era of renewed personal
accountability, I suspect more mass restructuring debtors will emerge with
viable businesses but woefully tainted assets. In fact, J&J may consider a
public beneﬁt component for LTL Management; indeed, the company’s
talcum powder business is still extremely proﬁtable and does not face the
same legal challenges overseas that it does domestically.
CONCLUSION
This Essay attempts to delineate the new shadowed practices in mass
restructuring cases and oﬀer a few normative proposals to minimize victim
exploitation risk. The ultimate result is primarily descriptive but serves a vital
role in properly conceptualizing a complex problem in order to begin
discussion. And, a lot of discussion is necessary to address the deﬁciencies in
the machinery. This is one of the most controversial legal issues in the country
today, but there is very little scholarship addressing it. I suspect many scholars
and policymakers have been daunted because mass restructurings straddle
various complex disciplines. I hope this Essay will initiate the
interdisciplinary dialogue necessary to minimize further exploitation in this
new iteration of aggregate litigation.

99 See LOPUCKI, supra note 91; Parikh, supra note 91 (discussing the problem of forum shopping
in the bankruptcy system).

